Commission of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU. The USSR. composition of the supreme governing bodies of the CPSU and the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics Lenin Politburo composition

Let's look at the composition of the Politburo during Lenin's lifetime and the last composition of the Politburo during Stalin's lifetime, with an indication of how many years each member of the Politburo was in this body.

The first composition of the Politburo (1919).

It had 5 members.

(In 1917, the Politburo also existed, but, in fact, it was a provisional government, and since 1919 the Politburo exists as the highest party body).

Members of the Politburo:

IN AND. Lenin - until 1924.

N.N. Krestinsky - until 1921.

L.B. Kamenev - until 1926.

I.V. Stalin - until 1953 (until his death).

L.D. Trotsky - until 1926.

In addition, there were three candidates at that time.

G.E. Zinoviev - until 1926 he was in the Politburo.

N.I. Bukharin - until 1929.

M.I. Kalinin - until 1946 goals (until his death).

This is the composition of the first Politburo. We see two faces here: Stalin and Kalinin, who were members of the Politburo for decades until their deaths.

Now the last Politburo during Stalin's lifetime.

It had 11 members. (It was transformed into the Presidium at the XIX Congress of the CPSU.).

I.V. Stalin - was in the Politburo since 1919, for more than 34 years without a change.

V. M. Molotov - from 1921 to 1957, 36 years without change.

K.E. Voroshilov - from 1926 to 1960, 34 years without change.

L.M. Kaganovich - from 1926 to 1957, 31 years old.

A.A. Andreev - from 1930 with one break when he was not a member of the Politburo, but a total of 22 years in the Politburo until 1956.

A.I. Mikoyan - from 1926 goals until 1960, permanently 34 years old.

N.S. Khrushchev - from 1938 to 1964, over 26 years.

L.P. Beria - from 1939 to 1953, 14 years old.

G.M. Malenkov - from 1941 to 1957, 16 years old.

ON THE. Bulganin - from 1946 to 1958, 12 years old.

A.N. Kosygin - from 1946 to 1979, 33 years old.

At that time there was only one candidate for the Politburo - Shvernik Nikolai Mikhailovich, he was elected to the Politburo for the first time since 1939 and was 23 years old with one break.

Let's compare these lists. In fact, being in the Politburo became a lifelong affair. That is, the movement was stopped. This, of course, extremely discouraged the new. But it's not only that. The point is also that such was the established organizational regime for the selection of leadership. The fact is that what Lenin so feared in his last works - the replacement of the system of democratic centralism by bureaucratic centralism, was largely implemented in practice.

What was it expressed in?

The main characteristics of bureaucratic centralism boiled down to six phenomena.

First. This is a low level of development of mass culture and democracy.

Most of the lower cadres at the level of volost and even district organizations, not to mention the masses themselves, had an extremely low level of general, professional and political culture. And this level was in the 20-30s of the twentieth century an objective obstacle for these people to make independent decisions. They needed a template, instructions, appealed to the top. And this created a massive support for the phenomenon, which was later called the cult of personality. In the presence of a strong qualitative composition of the Politburo, this shortcoming was tolerable. However, the old guard in the leadership of the party was quickly knocked out, and from top to bottom, the stereotype of a thoughtless performer was being implanted from above.

In principle, with an increase in the cultural level of the masses, this shortcoming could be corrected. However, the growth of democracy in parallel with the growth of culture, as Lenin planned in his last works (and this is the idea of ​​a cultural revolution), the Stalinist apparatus did not allow this growth.

Democracy developed, but only its forms developed, the essence changed little.

Second. The selection of middle and top-level personnel was carried out by Stalin himself.

The professional abilities of middle and top-level personnel were much higher than at the bottom. But, in this link (region, territory, republic), the selection was carried out personally and undividedly by Stalin himself. Moreover, it was carried out on the principle of personal devotion. (This layer was boundlessly devoted to him and bears full responsibility for everything that happened under him).

Why did these people unquestioningly serve Stalin?

The fact is that in those days, people who reached this high level were compensated for the difficult working conditions in a certain way. They were compensated, firstly, by material support according to needs. And in this light, the reduction of the party maximum introduced under Lenin became inevitable. It was finally liquidated in 1934.

(True, it should be added that these people worked without regard for anything, worked above all standards. them and the bulk of workers was so great that it gave rise to elements of social injustice).

In addition, the obedience of this link was compensated by a certain permissiveness in relation to the lower ones. For the lower level, the middle manager was as omnipotent as the higher leader, above all, Stalin, was for him.

A kind of pyramid was built, tapering upwards.

Third. Increasing role of the apparatus.

Not the elected apparatus, but the link with which the leaders worked at high levels. That apparatus, in which, as each individual person, does not matter in itself, but in the aggregate this apparatus (the apparatus is also largely non-replaceable, people in which they worked for decades) acquired enormous significance.

Fourth. Each lower link was only a common cog in the leadership.

Each worker from top to bottom was only a certain representative of the system, but not an authorized leader in his area of ​​​​competence, even at home. All rights were practically delegated upwards. Each lower link was only a common cog in the leadership. This was due primarily to the lack of cost accounting.

Fifth. Fear.

Under such conditions, the functioning of the system could only be ensured through strict administration, in which one element had to be present - the element of fear. Fear, obedience. Hence came the growing role of the punitive organs, which were personally controlled by Stalin. To maintain fear, constant exposure of the enemies of the people, extensive repressions, and spy mania became mandatory.

Let's give illustrative examples.

The first Soviet government headed by Lenin had 15 people.

The first on the list in the decree adopted by the Second Congress of Soviets was V.I. Ulyanov (Lenin), and the last (fifteenth) - I.V. Dzhugashvili (Stalin). Between them were 13 more people: N.I. Rykov, V.P. Milyutin, A.G. Shlyapnikov, V.A. Ovseenko (Antonov). N.V. Krylenko, P.E. Dybenko, V.P. Nogin. A.V. Lunacharsky, I.I. Skvortsov-Stepanov, L.D. Trotsky (Bronstein), G.I. Oppkov (Lomov), I.A. Teodorovich, N.P. Avilov (Glebov).

What is the fate of these people?

Ten of them were declared spies and enemies of the people, with all the ensuing consequences. Only 3 people died of their own death. Nogin - in 1924 shortly after the death of Lenin, Skvortsov-Stepanov 4 years later - in 1928 and Lunacharsky - in 1932.

The history textbooks contain the composition of the members of the Stalinist Politburo. In general, for all the years of the existence of this body during the life of Stalin, 40 people visited it.

Their fates were different. Some died a natural death, others, judging by official documents, were helped in this, and the third group went partly through trials, and then without any trials (people were simply declared enemies of the people). In general, 22 people out of 40 experienced this fate. These people were either repressed or died, and official documents appeared that they were either poisoned or something else happened.

Frunze, Kuibyshev, Zhdanov died from illness, but under circumstances that caused the press to assert the murder. As for Frunze, the official communication itself did not contain any such role of accusations, but soon a publication appeared very transparently written, which said that Frunze's illness was taken advantage of. For which the writer B. Pilnyak was repressed. This was directly stated in the indictment in his case.

As for Kuibyshev and Zhdanov, there have been reports that their deaths were caused by non-violent means.

They were killed or committed suicide without subsequent defamation, but after certain clashes with Stalin, two people: S.M. Kirov and G.K. Ordzhonikidze. 17 people were repressed, killed, committed suicide and then were accused of high treason. All under Stalin. These are: L.D. Trotsky, L.B. Kamenev, G.E. Zinoviev, N.I. Bukharin, A.I. Rykov, V.Ya. Chubar, S.I. Syrtsov, P.P. Postyshev.

Twenty-two people died under unnatural circumstances. Twenty-two people out of forty are more than half of the Politburo.

Officially, two people were convicted for violations of socialist legality: N.I. Yezhov and L.P. Beria. Yezhov was a candidate member of the Politburo. Beria was a member of the Politburo. Yezhov - this is under Stalin, Beria - in 1953.

Here are the actions of this device.

Sixth. Actually a cult of personality.

The cult of personality is the deification of the leader, endowing him with supernatural qualities. The leader who knows everything, knows everything, can do everything. How did all this fit in with the ideals of socialism? Very simply, by dissolving the ideal. Stalin became the epitome of socialism. Few people knew what a real person was, bearing the pseudonym Stalin. His biographies were published very short. In 1946, after the war, a book about Stalin was published, which was of an official political nature, but, in fact, there was nothing about a person in it. There I.V. Stalin was presented as a symbol of socialism. And when a person disappears and a symbol remains, then there is a substitution of concepts and certain slogans arise that remain in the minds of people. So memorable to all Soviet people, the slogan "For the Motherland, for Stalin!", in fact, meant - "For socialism, for the revolution, for the people!"

History does not know the subjunctive mood, what was - can not be changed. But she is also a good teacher. Let's study our history and not repeat the mistakes made by others.

WHAT FORMS STALIN'S FIGHT WITH THE INTERNAL PARTY OPPOSITION TAKEN IS CLEARLY VISIBLE ON THE EXAMPLE OF THE FEBRUARY-MARCH PLENUM OF THE CC AUCP(B) OF 1937

“Transcript of the report of the People's Commissar of the NKVD N.I. Yezhov
at the February-March Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in 1937

Molotov. Comrades, allow me to declare the session of the plenum open. Do members of the plenum have any comments on the agenda?

Molotov. No objections?

Molotov. Approved. Let's start with the first question - "The case of Bukharin and Rykov." Yezhov's report.

Yezhov. Comrades, at the last Plenum of the Central Committee of the Party, on the basis of the testimony of Kamenev, Pyatakov, Sokolnikov, Sosnovsky, Uglanov and Kulikov, I reported on the existence of an anti-Soviet organization of the Rights, which was headed by the center, consisting of Bukharin, Rykov, Tomsky, Uglanov and Schmidt. I then reported to the Plenum of the Central Committee of the party that the members of the center - Bukharin, Rykov, Tomsky, Uglanov: firstly, they knew about the existence of an underground anti-Soviet Trotskyite-Zinovievist united bloc; secondly, they knew about the existence of an underground anti-Soviet Trotskyist parallel center; thirdly, they were aware that the Trotskyist-Zinovievist united bloc and the Trotskyist parallel center, in their struggle against the Party and the Soviet government, had switched to methods of terror, sabotage, and sabotage; fourthly, they were aware of the treacherous platform of the Trotskyist-Zinoviev bloc aimed at restoring capitalism in the USSR with the help of foreign fascist interventionists and, finally, fifthly, members of the center Bukharin, Uglanov and Rykov stood on the same platform, contacted the anti-Soviet activities of their right organization with the Trotskyist organization.

In view of the seriousness of the accusations brought against Bukharin and Rykov, the previous Plenum of the Central Committee of the Party, at the suggestion of Comrade Stalin, passed a resolution that the question of the specific guilt of candidates for members of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Bukharin and Rykov be transferred to the present Plenum in order to in order to carry out the most careful and conscientious investigation of the anti-Soviet activities of the right during this time, in particular the specific guilt of Bukharin and Rykov. Guided by this decision of the Plenum of the Central Committee, during this time the activities of the organization of the right and the involvement of Bukharin and Rykov in it were investigated, which was expressed mainly as follows:

1. In Moscow, Leningrad, Rostov-on-Don, Sverdlovsk, Saratov, Ivanovo-Voznesensk, Khabarovsk and in some other cities, the Trotskyists Pyatakov, Radek, Yakovlev, Beloborodoe and many other whom you know: Uglanov, Kotov, Yakovlev, Alexander Slepkov, Vasily Slepkov, Astrov, Tsetlin, Lugovoi, Rosit, Shoemaker[s] ... (lists), Kozlov, Vasily Schmidt and many others. All the listed members of the organization of the Rights, as well as the Trotskyists, gave exhaustive testimony about all the anti-Soviet activities of the organization of the Rights and their personal participation in it. They fully confirmed the accusations that were previously brought against Bukharin and Rykov at the previous Plenum and supplemented them with a large number of new facts.

These facts leave no doubt that until recently there existed a relatively ramified organization of the Rights headed by Bukharin, Rykov, Tomsky and Uglanov. The investigation into the activities of the rightists, in our opinion, was carried out with sufficient thoroughness and objectivity. The objectivity of this investigation is confirmed by the following facts: firstly, in completely different cities, by different investigators, at different times, dozens of the most active members of the right-wing organization were interviewed, who at different times and in different places confirmed the same acts. Thus, the investigation had the opportunity to objectively compare the testimonies of dozens of those arrested, who basically confirmed - with individual minor deviations in relation to the individual anti-Soviet activities of each - all the testimonies.

Secondly, comrades, many of the most active participants in the organization of the right, and in particular such closest friends of Bukharin, his students as Efim Tsetlin, Astrov, themselves expressed their voluntary consent to tell the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs and the party body the whole truth about the anti-Soviet activities of the right for the entire time of their existence and tell all the facts that they hid during the investigation in 1933. Thirdly, in order to verify the testimonies objectively, the Politburo of the Central Committee arranged a confrontation between Bukharin and Pyatakov, Radek, Sosnovsky, Kulikov, Astrov. The confrontation was attended by TT. Stalin, Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, Ordzhonikidze, Mikoyan and other members of the Politburo. All the members of the Politburo of the Central Committee who were present at the confrontation repeatedly raised the question before all the arrested Trotskyists and rightists whether they had slandered Bukharin and Rykov, whether they had shown too much of themselves. All of those arrested fully confirmed the testimony and insisted on it.

You yourselves understand, comrades, that the temptation for those arrested, who speak not only about the activities of others, not to a lesser extent, but to a greater extent about their own anti-Soviet activities, was tempted when such a question was asked, to answer in the negative, to refuse to testify. Despite this, all confirmed these testimonies.

Rykov was given a confrontation with people with whom he himself wished to have a confrontation. The closest employees personally associated with him in the past - Nesterov, Ragin, Kotov, Vasily Schmidt - all of them confirmed the preliminary testimony at the confrontation, and despite the strictest warning that if they slander themselves and Rykov, they will punished, they nonetheless confirmed their preliminary testimony. Moreover, in these face-to-face confrontations they gave a whole series of new facts, reminding Rykov of individual conversations, of individual directives that were received from him, and of individual facts that Rykov could not even deny.

Thus, comrades, we believe that the documentary and investigative material that we have at our disposal leaves no doubt that until recently an anti-Soviet organization of the Rights existed and operated, whose members, like the Trotskyists and Zinovievites, set themselves the task of overthrowing the Soviet government. , a change in the Soviet social and state structure existing in the USSR. Like the Trotskyites and Zinovievites, they embarked on the path of outright betrayal of their homeland, on the path of terror against the leaders of the Party and the Soviet government, on the path of sabotage and subversion in the national economy. From the same materials of the investigation and documents it follows that the guilt of Bukharin and Rykov has been fully proved, the guilt of the gravest crimes against the party and the state, which were brought against them at the previous Plenum and about which I am going to report now.

Turning to a concrete presentation of the investigative and documentary materials that are at our disposal, I consider it necessary to make the reservation that I will not touch on the history of the question, although there are a lot of interesting facts from the historical point of view of the development of the organization of the Rights and its struggle against the party. I will deal with these facts only insofar as they are relevant to the discussion of today's issue.

If we dwell on the emergence and development of the anti-Soviet organization of the right, then on the basis of the materials of the investigation and documentary materials, its activities can be divided into approximately three stages. The first stage is 1921–27, when the organization of the right was born in the form of Bukharin’s school, on the one hand, and in the form of the well-known trade unionist cadres of trade unionists headed by Trotsky, on the other, which subsequently turned into one of the main and main parts of the organization of the right. The second stage - 1927-30, when all right-wing opportunist groups headed by Rykov in the Soviet apparatus, Tomsky - in the trade union, Uglanov - in the Moscow party organization reached out to the school of Bukharin, to the trade unionists. All together, by the June Plenum of the Central Committee of 1928, they formed a completely cohesive faction with its own platform, intra-factional discipline and its own centralized leadership. Finally, the third stage is 1930–37. (I unite here), when the organization of the right goes underground, refuses to openly defend its views, double-dealingly masking its attitude towards the party line, towards the leadership of the party, and gradually slips into terror tactics, to organizing an insurrection in the countryside, to organizing strikes and, finally , to sabotage and wrecking activities in the national economy.

Let me not stop at the first two stages, taking here only the two most important facts. The first fact related to the first stage in the development of the organization of the Rights is the following. From all his many years of struggle against Lenin, Bukharin, unfortunately, learned one lesson: he told his school directly that Lenin beat me because I did not have an organized group of my like-minded people. Therefore, after the death of Lenin, he immediately begins to put together a group of his like-minded people ...

Mikoyan. He is a big hero.

Yezhov.... which is subsequently formalized into Bukharin's well-known school. Even then, this school girl represented a completely complete factional group with its own program, with its intra-factional discipline. This whole school was brought up on the opposition of Bukharin to Lenin. The entire school believed that Bukharin, in his struggle and in his views on questions of the Soviet economy, on questions of the doctrine of the state, on imperialism, was right, while Lenin was wrong. Every single participant in the Bukharin school speaks about this. Moreover, Bukharin did not hide this. He directly brought them up in this school on such opposition to Lenin. Moreover, he educated himself not only in opposition to Lenin, but also in opposition to the Central Committee of the Party, believing that the Central Committee of the Party was also pursuing an incorrect policy. There were literally no secrets from this school of young Bukharinites. All the secrets, all the questions of the Politburo that were discussed - and as you know, Bukharin was a member of the Politburo - were necessarily discussed in the school.

The second fact, comrades, is related to the second stage. Everyone knows that the leaders of the Right Opposition in 1928 and later proved that there were no factions among them, much less any illegal organization. They asserted that the whole point boils down to the fact that the Rights, in their own way, honestly, each individually, not bound by factional discipline, upheld and defended their wrong views. The facts say otherwise. Already by 1928, a complete faction of the right had fully formed, which opposed its line to the line of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. It was formed, as I have already said, on the one hand, from the Bukharin school, from the right-wing opportunist trade unionists of the trade unionists, from some economic workers from the economic Soviet apparatus, and, finally, from some leading party workers of the Moscow Party organization.

The third fact, which is related to the same period, is that already in 1928, to direct all factional activities and their struggle against the party, the Rights created a leading center, which included Rykov, Bukharin, Tomsky, Schmidt, Uglanov and Ugarov. As has now been established by the materials of the investigation and documents, this center led the entire factional struggle of the right. All speeches of the rightists at plenums, on the assets of the party organization during 1928-29. previously necessarily discussed in this center. Moreover, the well-known anti-Party foray of the Rights at the congress of trade unions, where they tried their hand, was entirely directed by this factional centre. During the meetings of the congress, the center met almost continuously at Tomsky's apartment, setting up vigils. Either Rykov, or Bukharin, or Tomsky, or others were on duty all the time. Such speeches, for example, as the speeches of Kotov and Rozit at the April Plenum of the Central Committee in 1929, their theses were approved, were previously viewed by the center, only after that they spoke.

These are the main facts that I thought it necessary to note from the activities of the Rights at the first stage of the development of this organization and at the second. As for the third, main and main stage, it is drawn approximately in the following form. After the defeat of the Rights at the November Plenum of the Central Committee in 1929, the center of the Rights came to the conclusion that an open attack against the Party was hopeless and doomed to failure. Continuing to stand on its right-wing opportunist positions, the center of the right, in order to save its cadres from final defeat, embarked on the path of double-dealing capitulation. In the hope that it will be possible in the near future to launch a new attack against the Party, the center is discussing the whole plan, the whole double-dealing tactic. Here, the mistakes of the Trotskyites, the mistakes of the Zinovievists are taken into account, and a plan for the double-dealing filing of applications is worked out literally to the last detail. This plan is as follows: first, all members of the right who are involved in the organization of the right, who are not yet known to the party organizations as being actively associated with the right, are given a directive to conspire their connections for the time being and not to get out anywhere, not to submit any applications. Special tactics are being worked out for the Muscovites, especially for the members of the Central Committee from the Moscow organization.

During the November Plenum of the Central Committee in 1929, the center meets, and in the center they invite Uglanov, Kotov and Kulikov to make penitential speeches and submit an application at the November Plenum of the Central Committee. What is the goal being pursued? The goal is as follows: to preserve the Moscow group of workers at all costs, to preserve Uglanov, since a new fight, a new attack against the Central Committee of the Party, was planned for the near future, when they recovered. As is known, Uglanov, Kotov and Kulikov, then members of the Central Committee, made such a declaration and filed a repentant declaration renouncing their right-wing opportunist views and breaking with the opposition. It is also known, comrades, that Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky filed these applications much later. Now Rykov and Bukharin are not averse to depicting this fact as follows: “Well, de, you attribute to us the existence of some faction with its own discipline, etc., but I found out about filing an application with surrender, with rejection of right-wing views only at the Plenum of the Central Committee itself. Even more than that, I was so outraged, considering it a stab in the back.” In fact, this "stab in the back" was rather mild, because it was discussed in advance, and there was no blow here. The whole plan was built only with the expectation of preserving at all costs the top of the Moscow organization of the Rights, strengthening their position in order to launch a new attack against the Central Committee of the Party at the first opportunity.

Further on, comrades, after Rykov, Bukharin and Tomsk have submitted their application, the center instructs its local supporters to capitulate immediately. By the way, at that time, plenums of regional committees, regional committees and the Central Committee of the National Communist Parties were held, assets were gathered, where the issue related to the struggle of the right opposition against the party and the condemnation of this struggle was discussed. At most of these plenums and activists, active rightists, especially from among Bukharin's students, came out most ardently in defense of their old right-wing positions, in defense of Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky. And for them, the "order", as Slepkov calls it, the order for the faction regarding the immediate filing of an application with a refusal was completely unexpected. There were some oddities, for example, this one: Slepkov, being at the plenum of the regional committee in Samara ... in the morning makes a speech in defense of his positions, in defense of the right-wing positions, in defense of Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky; during the lunch break he comes to his hotel, or to his apartment, receives a directive from Bukharin with a courier to slowly capitulate. At the evening meeting, he makes a speech of repentance, renounces all his convictions, condemns the right. And as he now says: “It was so insulting that I cried all night because I was put in such an idiotic position.” So, comrades, in this way, even at the time of the submission of statements of repentance, there was no doubt that the centralized leadership of the right-wing faction was operating, which gave the order to capitulate, while at the same time developing a plan for this surrender in all details.

That is how things stand, comrades, with Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky's supposedly sincere refusal to uphold their positions in the struggle against the Party. They take positions of double-dealing, go underground in order to intensify their anti-Soviet activities at the first opportunity.

By this time, comrades, i.e. By the beginning of 1930, or in 1930, taking into account all the maneuvers of the Rights, we had the formed organization of the Rights in approximately the following form. The rightists had their center in the composition of Bukharin, Rykov, Tomsky, Uglanov and Schmidt. Secondly, in order to unite the leadership of the underground activities of the rightists working in Moscow, the so-called Moscow center was formed, which includes: Uglanov, Kulikov, Kotov, Matveev, Zapolsky, Yakovlev. At the same time, in the localities, on the periphery, groups of right-wingers are being formed from among the most active participants in the organization and, mainly, participants in the school of Bukharin, who, by decision of the Central Committee, were sent to work in the localities. Such groups are formed: in Samara - Slepkov's group, which includes Levin, Arefiev, Zhirov; in Saratov - a group of Petrov [Petrovsky P.G.] consisting of Zaitsev, Lapin [Lapkin V.S.]; in Kazan - Vasiliev's group; in Ivanovo - the Astrov group; in Leningrad - Maretsky's group consisting of Chernov and others; in Novosibirsk - a group of Yaglom and Kuzmin; in Voronezh - a group of Sapozhnikov and, somewhat later, Nesterov; in Sverdlovsk - Nesterov's group.

By 1930 these groups had more or less taken shape, organized themselves with their factional discipline and made every effort to recruit supporters for themselves. They existed until 1932 with a slight change in their composition, when many of their members were exposed in anti-Soviet activities, were subjected to repression, a significant part was arrested after the well-known right-wing conference held in Moscow in August 1932. Some were arrested in connection with the exposure of the Ryutin group, and after 1932-33. members of the organization go even deeper underground. The members of the center and their local supporters keep in touch with each other only through the chain. If in 1932–33 Since we had a large number of conferences, meetings and even a conference, then in subsequent years all meetings are prohibited and communication is established only at the beginning of personal meetings. That is how things stand, comrades, with regard to the emergence and development of the anti-Soviet organization of the Rights, as it is drawn from the materials of the investigation and the documents that we have at our disposal.

What is the political platform of the organization of the right throughout its existence? Here, comrades, I will not touch upon individual documents known to all that were submitted by the right-wingers at one time to the Central Committee of the party, but I will begin with a description of those documents that are at least at our disposal now.

In 1929, the thoughts were like that even before 1929, the Rights considered it necessary to generalize their individual disparate notes, their disagreements with the party, into some kind of single document. There was an attempt to draw up such a platform document in order to submit it to the Central Committee of the Party. Such a document has been drawn up. However, the members of the Party of the Center of the Rights did not dare to submit it to the Central Committee of the Party, they hid it from the Central Committee of the Party. True, they did not hide it from the Trotskyites and Zinovievites. Bukharin, for example, showed this document to Pyatakov. Kamenev was also aware of this document. However, they did not submit it to the Central Committee of the Party. The members of their organization were also sufficiently aware of this generalizing document.

I will not go into the details of this document. I will only say that it is not relevant for the discussion of today's issue. I will only say one thing, that the document more or less frankly sets out proposals that, in essence, led to capitalist restoration in the USSR, accusing the Central Committee of the Party of all sorts of completely intolerant, vile attacks. Including slipping onto the Trotskyist rails, the rightists state in it their disagreement on all the fundamental questions of our socialist construction and make their proposals.

This document did not see the light of day. The right hid him. I repeat, it has no actual significance for the discussion of today's issue. I touched on it only briefly and want to move on to later documents. First of all, it is necessary to dwell on the so-called Ryutin platform. First of all, it also combines the mysterious Ryutin platform. The emergence of this platform was interpreted in different ways. The main thing that was revealed was that there was some kind of wild right-wing group that was more repressive. They decided to summarize all their moods and mindsets as a platform. So this wild group is spreading this platform. This platform was spread by the Rights, by the Ryutinites themselves, by the Zinovievists, and by the Trotskyists. They were a little surprised, to say the least, that, for example, Rykov gave such instructions to his closest assistants to contact a right-wing organization. Bukharin says that this document does not exist, says that the GPU invented it.

But what is the picture of the appearance of this document, its nature, in fact, how it is drawn on the basis of the investigative materials that we have. Now, comrades, it has been absolutely indisputably proved that Ryutin's platform was drawn up on the initiative of the Rights represented by Rykov, Bukharin, Tomsky, Uglanov and Schmidt. Around this platform they intended to unite all the elements that disagreed with the Party: the Trotskyists, the Zinovievists, the Rights. According to the testimony of the notorious V. Schmidt, the case with her appearance is drawn approximately as follows.

In connection with the revival of anti-Soviet activities of various kinds of groupings, in the spring of 1932, the rightists decided at all costs to draw up a political platform on the basis of which they could unite their entire organization and attract all groups to it.

To this end, in the spring of 1932, at the dacha near Tomsky in Bolshevo, a center of the right was assembled, consisting of Bukharin, Rykov, Tomsky, Uglanov and Schmidt. At this meeting, the members of the center agreed on all the main fundamental issues of the platform and outlined its plan. Schmidt showed that even something like theses was sketched out. Then the center of the right instructed Uglanov to get in touch with Ryutin, to involve some of the literate people, to formalize this platform, to compile and submit it to the center for consideration. The platform, based on these preliminary notes, instructions from the center, was compiled in the fall of 1932. Uglanov receives this platform, the initial sketch of this very platform is already finished and suggests that the center should gather again. At the suggestion of Uglanov, they again gather in Bolshevo at the dacha near Tomsky under the guise of a party or some kind of drink, and there they subject this document to the most thorough processing and reading. They read it point by point and made corrections. At this second meeting of the center were present: Uglanov, Rykov, Schmidt, Tomsky. Then Bukharin was not there, he was either on vacation or on a business trip. This is how Schmidt explains it.

Vasily Schmidt paints a picture of the discussion of this platform as follows, since he took part in the approval and review of the platform. When considering this platform, Alexei Ivanovich Rykov opposed the first part, which provides an economic justification, and strongly rejected it. “It’s no good, she’s preaching too openly, it’s a direct restoration of capitalism, it’s too open. Gotta smooth it out. As for the practical part, where it is said about active methods of struggle against the government, where it is said about the transition to effective measures against the Party, here it is written well and one must agree with it.

Tomsky spoke: “The economic part is nonsense, whether it is corrected or not, then it can be corrected. The main thing is not in it (laughter), the main thing is this part, which speaks of active actions. Moreover, as Schmidt said, he called this part a terrorist part. "This part is well written, and since it is well written, let's agree with it and approve it." Everyone agreed with Tomsky, the platform was approved and, judging by the approximate dates that we now have the opportunity to check on the basis of these investigations - Schmidt does not remember exactly what day it was - but by comparing the investigation, it can be established that this coincides precisely with the moment of discussion of this platform at the dacha in Bolshevo near Tomsky.

Thus, comrades, the materials of the investigation, in our opinion, indisputably prove that in fact the authors of the real Ryutin platform are not some wild Ryutin group that accidentally fell from the sky, but the center of the right, including Rykov, Bukharin, Tomsky, Uglanov and Schmidt, they are the real authors and the fact that they entrusted their authorship to Ryutin does not change matters. At the same meeting, it was decided that if this platform is found somewhere and they will ask during the investigation, what Ryutin must necessarily hide and pass off as his own, declaring that this is a wild platform, etc. Here, comrades, is the true origin of the Ryuta platform.

It goes without saying that Bukharin and Rykov deny this case. Although yesterday at the confrontation with Schmidt, Rykov was forced to admit that at Tomsky's dacha he really read Ryutin's platform, however, he portrays this innocently and says that there were members of the Central Committee, apparently, members of the Central Committee received Ryutin's platform. I don't know if Ryutin's platform was sent to the members of the Central Committee?

Yezhov. He didn't say. He says that members of the Central Committee have the right to read any documents.

Yezhov. Yes, I said yesterday. I, comrades, will remind you in order to link the main provisions of the Ryuta platform with what follows. The Ryutin platform denies the socialist character of the Soviet state, demands the dissolution of collective farms and the rejection of collectivization, the rejection of the line of liquidation of the kulaks, of Soviet industrialization, proposes to unite all opposition groups, including Trotskyists, Zinovievites, Shlyapnikovites, rightists, to fight against the party and the Soviet government. leftists, etc. and openly formulates and proposes individual terror as practical measures, demands, just like the Trotskyists in their well-known letter, to remove Stalin, by this they mean to kill Stalin, invites all his like-minded people to issue leaflets, proclamations, organize strikes in factories and demands, finally, the overthrow of the Soviet government through an armed uprising.

If you carefully read the individual proposals of this platform, then in such a veiled, vague form there is a call for sabotage and sabotage of the activities of the Party and government. This platform, comrades, was essentially a document expressing the aspirations, sentiments, and views that demanded a direct capitalist restoration in the USSR. If you attach the latest editions of Trotsky's agreement with Hitler ...

Yezhov. This is the same. Such is the case with the Ryutin platform.

After the Ryutin platform, after its release, approximately 5 years have passed. During these years, comrades, the country has advanced gigantically. For everyone, the victory of socialism has become quite obvious. Under the conditions of the final victory of socialism, it will not work to continue an active struggle against the Soviet government, hiding behind Soviet phraseology. The case is hopeless, anyone will be able to expose. Therefore, certain right-wing sentiments inevitably had to arise in the group to formulate their sentiments more frankly. We have now discovered such an attempt to form a platform during the investigation. It is related to the years 1936-37. This platform itself is extremely characteristic. This platform has an appeal to all the peoples of the Soviet Union and to all the youth. The authors of the platform are Alexander Slepkov, a notorious student of Bukharin, Kuzmin, a student of Bukharin, and finally Khudyakov. Sitting in prison, in the isolation ward, they wrote this program, this platform, and when Khudyakov was released, they offered him, since he was going into exile in Western Siberia, in Biysk, they suggested that he contact, gave him addresses, offered to contact the organization of the right, to discuss the platform and express your opinions.

I, comrades, will read to you some provisions of the new platform. First of all, its philosophical part. It says the following: "Marxism as an integral worldview [...] and, finally, the doctrine of the class struggle." All this, according to the authors of the platform, has been refuted by life, Marxism has completely outlived itself. Then there are arguments about the statements of Spencer, Herzen and Bakunin, etc., which have justified themselves and are blocked by life. Criticizing the political part of our system, they say the following in the program:

“The socialist economic system turned out to be in fact the most bureaucratic ... in its rings, the boa constrictor strangled all living things.” And further: "The dictatorship of the proletariat with its monopoly position..."

Yezhov."The philosophy of Marxism has become the most reactionary, ossified dogma... of defense and attack." Based on this, the authors of the platform consider it a sacred and unswerving duty to overthrow such despotic power. And then they propose to form a new party called the People's Democratic Party of Russia. (Indignation in the hall.) This is how the former cadet Slepkov formulates his views today, the dog has returned to its vomit.

Further, what are the main tasks for the nearest period they propose. They consider it their first and main duty to overthrow the Stalinist regime. By what means? They offer the following: “This destruction can occur as a result of various causes and methods, of which we consider the following to be the most successful and expedient: 1) As a result of an external impact, i.e. as a result of the offensive war between Germany and Japan against the USSR.

Antipov. We know business.

Yezhov."2) As a result of a palace coup or a military coup, which could be carried out by one of the Red generals."

Mezhlauk. Also familiar.

Yezhov. The case of palace coups, you know enough about it from the protocols that have been handed over to you, and it must be said that Rykov, Bukharin and others rushed about this matter for a very long time. Thus, comrades, this program puts forward the military attack of fascist Germany and Japan on the Soviet Union in first place. They openly formulate their defeatist attitude towards this.

In addition, the program does not renounce individual terror. True, they call it, apparently based on the experience of the Kirov events, this is “terrorist partisanism” and suggest switching to group terror.

Shkiryatov. This is also familiar to us.

Yezhov. This is also quite familiar from the discussions that Bukharin had with Radek and others. But, it is true, they do not reject individual murders either. However, it is said that the latest "modernity", i.e. the murder of Kirov does not testify in her favor. But, however, they argue, "the appearance of Caesar always inevitably entails the appearance of Brutus." (Noise, movement in the hall.) They say: "We terrorists have a completely different attitude towards terror than the so-called official Marxism." Here, comrades, is the last revelation of this group of Rights, which has come to the end.

By the way, today we received a telegram from Novosibirsk, where the investigation is ongoing, and it turns out that Deputy. prev. West Siberian State Planning Committee, how is it?

Eikhe. Edelman.

Yezhov. Deputy prev. Gosplan Edelman accepted this platform and carried it out in his right-wing group.

Voroshilov. Where was this platform created?

Yezhov. In isolation. (Laugh.)

Kosior. This is an interesting insulator. (Laugh.)

Lozovsky. This platform is Bukharin's school.

Yezhov. Yes, it was composed by Slepkov, Kuzmin and Khudyakov known to you. These are people very close to Slepkov, involved in the organization, his pupils. Here, comrades, such are the programmatic political guidelines of the Rights, which are drawn to us on the basis of the investigative and documentary materials that we now have at our disposal.

I pass on to the actual side of the anti-Soviet activity of the rightists, which they were able to develop in our peculiar difficult conditions, to their work over the years. Having set as their goal the restoration of capitalism in the USSR and the seizure of power, as our socialist construction progressed, they fell lower and lower every day and passed on to the most acute forms of struggle.

First of all, comrades, about the terrorist activities of the Rights. Based on all the investigative materials that we now have at our disposal, there is no doubt that the Rights have long since begun to recognize the possibility of terror against the leaders of the party and government. In conditions of complete political isolation and the impossibility of showing their true face in any other way, the right, in the end, just like the Trotskyists and Zinovievites, switched to positions of individual terror. Here the comrades know some facts from the protocols, but I want to say that the terrorist sentiments among the Rights originated much earlier. The first terrorist statements and conversations of a rather frank nature, which were revealed in the organization of the Rights, we had already in 1928. This same Kuzmin, who is not unknown to you, the author of this platform, already in 1928 expressed directly the idea of ​​the need to kill Comrade Stalin. He expressed aloud what was then talked about, not wanting to say it directly, the people around him, including Slepkov and others. Back in 1928, Kuzmin directly raised the question, he raised this question, and it was not generally a cry of an enraged young guy involved in an anti-Soviet organization, it was the conviction of a person. He said this already in the year 28, it is enough to read his diary to imagine all his moods in those years.

They can say: Kuzmin is a loner, according to a Russian proverb - "the family has its black sheep." Unfortunately, there are too many freaks in the family of the right...

Eikhe. Just some freaks.

Yezhov. Slepkov as early as 1927-28, Sapozhnikov directly raised this issue, and then later they moved on to organizing terrorist acts. Well, comrades, the following question can be put here: what does Bukharin and Rykov have to do with it?

Yezhov. Perhaps these are the moods of individual supporters of them? Unfortunately, I must say that terrorist groups were most actively organized where they were organized on the direct orders of either Bukharin, or Rykov, or Tomsky. All of you received the investigative material in the case of the right. Therefore, I will confine myself to pointing out the most characteristic, from my point of view, facts.

What does Rosit, the notorious Rosit, one of Bukharin's closest students and friend, say? He shows: “Terror in our country is not an accidental phenomenon. Bukharin brought up and cultivated in us an exceptional hatred of Stalin and his associates. I do not remember a single meeting, not a single meeting with Bukharin, where he did not incite this hatred. In this regard, I recalled Slepkov's expression that hatred of Stalin is sacred hatred. By the way, to say that this hatred of Stalin determined loyalty to Rykov, Bukharin and Tomsky - that was the criterion.

In 1930, at Slepkov's dacha in Pokrovsko-Streshnevo, Bukharin would personally set the stage for terror and motivate this by the fact that the right-wing stake on winning a majority in the CPSU (b) was beaten. The same Rozit gives the following testimony: “Bukharin directly said that it was necessary to start preparing a terrorist group against Stalin and his closest associates ... (reads). That is, people did not even raise any doubts about this, because already before that the ground had already been completely prepared. Why am I citing this testimony of Rosita? We have Slepkov, and Maretsky, and all the rest of Bukharin's school. I am citing Rosita's testimony because he is one of those people who were closer to Bukharin until recently. Such, comrades, is Bukharin.

As for Rykov, at first glance it seems like he has nothing to do with it. True, from the latest testimony that you read, it is known that he, too, has something to do with it, has a direct involvement in this case. True, Rykov, if we take the total of the members of this center, is much more cautious, much more conspiratorial, not a chatterer, he knows where to do what, and knows how to conspire, while Bukharin sometimes likes to shake things up. Tomsky went so far as to write down incredible nonsense in his rather frank notes. We can meet in them anti-obscene expressions (so in the text - V.S.), terry expressions addressed not only to individual leaders of the party and government, but even to our country. A man who until recently had a correspondence with the most terrifying White Guards, who cursed and cursed Soviet power with typically fascist expressions, this man considered it possible to receive this correspondence, read it and, moreover, keep it in an apartment and file it.

So, about Rykov. Despite all his secrecy and caution, I would like to cite the following testimony from Rykov's former head of secretariat at the Council of People's Commissars, Nesterov, a person who was personally very close to Rykov. He gives the following testimony: "Around Rykov, we, the Rights, tried to create such moods" ... (reads). In accordance with this, Rykov, despite his special position, does not hesitate to give direct instructions about the organization of terrorist groups. This same Nesterov tells how he, before leaving for Sverdlovsk in May 1931 ...

Molotov. What is Nesterov?

Yezhov. Head of the Rykov Secretariat. Rykov was delighted at the arrival of Nesterov and said that from the previous. From the Council of People's Commissars, he became a postmaster. Here, he says, you and the Politburo, here, he says, and the line for harmony, he ended up as a postmaster. He painted the situation in the country in rather gloomy colors and suggested that he organize a group of like-minded people in Sverdlovsk, pick up terrorist fighters in order to send them to Moscow on occasion. Nesterov shows: “How the party learned the organization of the armed forces in the era ... (reads). We need to learn how to shoot in a new way." And further, Rykov gave a direct order to organize terrorist groups. And further: "in this conversation, Rykov gave me a direct directive ..." (reads). A lot of incriminating evidence is also given by another former "scientific" secretary, Rykova Radin. He shows that "in one of his conversations with me, Rykov told me ..." (reads).

In the testimony of Radin, Kotov and others, you will find enough incriminating material. I want to dwell on just one fact. In face-to-face confrontations, it is extremely difficult to deny all these facts, which are directly presented to Rykov. By the way, he personally asked for face-to-face confrontations with certain people. He previously described Radin to me as an extremely intelligent, calm and talented person and asked me to arrange a confrontation with him earlier. When they arranged a confrontation with him, after that, or beforehand, he stated that, indeed, in 1932, Radin came to his apartment, and Radin had such anti-Party, anti-Soviet moods. He demanded from Rykov, allegedly: “Why are you sitting here in the center, doing nothing. Let's fight, get active, etc.” In a word, Radin pressed Rykov. In general, Rykov complained that Radin provoked him to such harsh speeches. But I, he says, scolded him, scolded him, kicked him out, etc. In particular, when Radin wanted to leave the party, he scolded him. In a word, Rykov wants to portray the matter in such a way that it was not he who influenced Radin, but Radin influenced Rykov. But at the same time, he limited himself to such paternal suggestions. Did he tell the party about it? Didn't say. This, he says, is my mistake.

Several facts showing that it is not only about talking about terror, it is about practical activities. Of the facts of this order, I cite the following. In 1931, on the instructions of Rykov, Nesterov organized a terrorist group in Sverdlovsk consisting of: Nesterov, Karbolit (Karmalitov A.I. - V.S.), Aleksandrov. Nesterov, Karbolit, Alexandrov - all admitted their participation in a terrorist organization, all testified that they had given their consent to join a terrorist organization, all admitted that, at the first call, they undertook to arrive at any place in the Soviet Union in order to sacrifice their lives in favor of his right-wing organization.

Second fact. A member of the Moscow Center of Right Kulikov, as well as Kotov, on behalf of Uglanov, created a terrorist group in Moscow in 1931 consisting of Kotov, Afanasyev, Nosov. Kotov, Uglanov, Afanasyev and Nosov all confessed to this. I will not give specific evidence, you know it from the protocols that have been sent out. It was further established that at the beginning of 1933, Bukharin instructed the former Trotskyist and former Socialist-Revolutionary Semyonov to prepare a terrorist act against Comrade Stalin. This is evidenced by Tsetlin - a person close enough to Bukharin, who knew all the ins and outs of what was going on with Bukharin, the most devoted person to him.

Finally, on the personal instructions of Rykov, she conducted surveillance, establishing the easiest ways to commit a terrorist act, a certain Artemenko - a close person to Rykov, the wife of this same Nesterov. Further, on the personal instructions of Rykov, an active member of the organization of the right, Radin, together with Slepkov, also conducted preparations for recruiting members to commit a terrorist act against comrade. Stalin.

I, comrades, completely rule out here the four terrorist groups organized by Tomsky; Such, comrades, is the documentary, factual side of the terrorist activity of the organization of the Rights. It seems to me that on the basis of the testimonies of all the participants, on the basis of the documents that we have, this side of the vile anti-Soviet activity of the Rights and the members of this center, Bukharin, Rykov, and others, has been completely proved.

Further, comrades, I would like to dwell in a few words on the idea of ​​the so-called "palace revolution". Along with the ideas of individual terror in 1930-31, the right-wingers talked intensely about the possibility of a real implementation of the idea of ​​the so-called "palace coup". It was conceived in different versions, but basically it was that it was necessary to arrest the government, bring in some kind of military unit, destroy the government and appoint your own. So, they assumed that they would succeed in quickly approaching power with such a short blow to the leadership of the party and government. This idea, quite common at one time, was widely discussed in right-wing circles. I think that, comrades, we have not yet fully dug into all the facts accompanying the discussion of these plans, but I do not rule out that some real prospects, they may have loomed before them at that time. Suffice it to say that we have just arrested one former Cheka worker in Leningrad, who worked in our apparatus, he attended a meeting in a group of Rights and strongly supported this very idea of ​​a "palace coup" as the most easily implemented. Moreover, he offered them his services in establishing communication ...

Yezhov. This is an ordinary worker, a former Belarusian worker, now working in a fire brigade in Leningrad.

What are the variants of this idea of ​​a "palace coup"? I will not dwell here on the testimony of Sapozhnikov, they are known to you, I will cite only the most characteristic testimony of Tsetlin. He gives the following testimony: “Bukharin personally initiated the idea of ​​a “palace coup” and put it forward with the full consent of Tomsky and Rykov” ... (reads). “A second option was put forward to carry out a “palace coup”: firstly, to extend our influence to the protection of the Kremlin, put together shock cadres loyal to our organization there, and carry out a coup by arrest ... (He reads, ending with the words: “Using his official position Rykov, as chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, to introduce this military unit by order to the Kremlin.”) In the event of a successful coup, they distributed posts. Tomsky was proposed for the post of secretary of the Central Committee, the rest of the posts in the Central Committee will be occupied by Slepkov and, in general, all other members of the right. These are the facts. Among those ideas that were especially characteristic of Bukharin in 1930-31 was the idea of ​​a "palace coup."

I, comrades, have dragged out my report for a while, allow me to publish this section completely, where it is said about the bloc with the Trotskyists and Zinovievites, because I cannot add anything new in comparison with those that were at the trial and which are known to everyone. It is only necessary to say about this very bloc with the Trotskyists and Zinovievites, about its certain originality, how it is drawn from the materials of the investigation and how it appears to me.

You see, the fact that after the defeat in 1929 the Rights immediately embarked on the path of seeking ties with the Zinovievists and Trotskyites is shown by Bukharin's well-known meeting, his negotiations, and so on. etc. Now we have one more new fact. The same Vasily Schmidt told us the following news that at the end of 1930, as far as I remember according to his testimony, Tomsky called Schmidt to his place and told him: “I need your dacha for the evening alone.” He asked him: "Why?" "None of yours," he says, "is the business." - "No, tell me." - "It is necessary for our meeting." He was a member of the center, he asks: “Can I?” “No,” he says, “you can't. Give me luck." - "At first I got a little balky, offended," he says. "Don't you want to give? We'll find another, we'll find another apartment." - “Well, then,” he says, “I provided it, I left myself. Then on the second day I attacked Tomsky and gave him a tantrum. What happens? You are there, troika, you decide something like that. I myself am a party member, what am I, an idiot, a fool, or something, I only have to obey you. What's the matter, tell me. He pressed Tomsky, and Tomsky let it slip, saying: “We had a date, there was Rykov, there was Bukharin and there was me, there was Kamenev at the dacha. To all my questions about what they talked about, he said: I won’t tell, I can’t say.

Rykov, of course, and Bukharin deny this, but I have one extremely interesting objective fact. The other day, Tomsky's wife, handing over some documents from her archive, said to me: “Here I am, Nikolai Ivanovich, I want to tell you one curious fact, maybe it will be useful to you. At the end of 1930, Mishka - she calls her husband that - was very worried. I know something was wrong. I saw that such and such people came to the dacha of Vasya Schmidt, he was not present there. I don’t know what they talked about, but they sat until late at night. I saw this thing by accident. Why am I saying this, that they can now blame Vasya Schmidt, but he doesn’t know anything. ” I say, "Why do you think he doesn't know anything?" - “Because on the second day I attacked Tomsky and said: what are you, such a bastard, you meet there again, fall asleep, get caught, what will happen to you? He says: shut up, none of your business. I quarreled with him and said that I would tell the Central Control Commission. Then Vasya Schmidt came, I attacked him: why are you giving your apartment for such meetings? He was terribly embarrassed and said: I don’t know anything.” Here is the fact she told. Thus, this is not only the testimony of this very Schmidt, it also coincides with the conversation that I had with her when we met.

Thus, comrades, already at the end of 1930, as you see, they consider it possible to meet outside the city, in a secret situation, to talk. I don't think it was a heartfelt conversation and tea drinking. If this were so, then, probably, Vasily Schmidt would have been invited. Apparently, the conversation was serious, about which they did not even consider it possible to inform Schmidt. Here Schmidt says: I told them - fools, Kamenev will betray you. They say: nothing, will not give out. Well, if he betrays us, we will destroy him physically. So Schmidt says. This is the first.

The link between the Rights and the Trotskyists and Zinovievites was also noted in 1932. These facts are known. But wariness, what explains that well-known caution or wariness when people did not go for a direct merger? It seems to me that here, above, they did not go, they gave a direct directive to a bloc with the Trotskyists below, and in fact we had a direct association with the Trotskyists in Samara, Saratov and Sverdlovsk. They unite in a bloc, act and work together, it is difficult to make out who is right there, there is no difference between them, they work together. And up here, they were cautious. Why were they careful? They proceeded from the following: they believed that Zinoviev, Kamenev and other Trotskyists and Zinovievites were so discredited that it was not safe to link one's fate with them. Therefore, they established mutual information, mutual awareness, mutual contact. But they did not go further than this in order to block directly. As some Rightists say, in particular, from Bukharin's school, here there was a well-known fear of the Rights that they would somehow not be kicked out in the event of a seizure of power, lest the Trotskyists get too many seats, etc. Although this is secondary. It seems to me that the main thing is that they did not go for an organizational merger with the Trotskyists - this is fear. There is still the last moment when a direct connection was established. Although it can be assumed that formally neither Bukharin, nor Rykov, nor the others were part of a parallel or united Trotskyist-Zinoviev center, the fact that they were fully aware of all their activities, that they were fully informed and agreed, is I have no doubt.

I want to dwell, comrades, on the position of the Rights, on the activities of the Rights in their relationship with the Socialist-Revolutionaries, and, in particular, I want to dwell on their attitude towards the kulak uprisings. Based on the materials of the investigation, which we now have, I must say frankly that the rightists gave direct instructions to their supporters in the field that in the event of village unrest, which they assumed would be widely developed in 1930-31-32, so as not to stay away from these movements, we must lead these movements. Of the facts that you know, I will not repeat them, I only want to say the following, that in 1930-31, according to the testimony of the now well-known Yakovenko, a partisan who was arrested ...

Molotov. Well, you all know.

Yezhov. Yes, absolutely right. So this same Yakovenko, in his testimony, says that in 1930-32 he had repeated conversations with Bukharin, expressed his disagreement with the party's policy in the countryside, believed that the party was especially mistaken on the issue of collectivization, considered kulak uprisings inevitable , considered it necessary to introduce these kulak and other uprisings into some kind of organized channel. Bukharin strongly supported him. He told Bukharin that he had a connection, a very close connection with the Siberian partisans. “People come to me endlessly, and that I have the opportunity to organize them.” A partisan center was formed.

Yakovenko himself informed Bukharin more or less regularly that he was in a position to organize an uprising in certain regions of Western Siberia, the Krasnoyarsk Territory, and Eastern Siberia. Bukharin then expressed the idea that if the uprising had been successfully organized, then the possibility is not ruled out that a certain autonomy could be organized there - the Siberian state, which would put pressure on the Stalinist regime (laughter), would help us in matters of collective farm policy .

Voroshilov. State within a state.

Kaganovich. Kind of like Kolchak.

Yezhov. They raised the question of the creation of this state. Further on, comrades, I will not read to you the testimony that you have on hand. I must say that the most ardent, active participation in all such events is the difficulty with grain procurements in the Kuban, in all Siberian bagpipes. The most active participation, wherever possible, was taken by the Rights as a directive - to get involved in this matter.

I will not enumerate the facts about the Socialist-Revolutionaries; there is nothing new here. Apart from Tsetlin's testimony, we have nothing. I will count only one preliminary testimony of Yakovenko. He shows: “I told Bukharin my negative point of view on the policy of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. He informed about his impression of my arrival in Siberia, from where I recently returned ... "(reads). Bukharin's attitude, he says, completely coincided with my views, and I accepted them.

Such are the facts that we have about the Right in relation to the questions of the peasant uprisings that took place in 1930-31, in a number of which they participated. They also took part in organized bagpipes at industrial enterprises. We are now at the stage of investigating the extremely important Vychug events and the events in Ivanovo in general. They were essentially organized by the right.

The material was prepared by Vladimir KOMISSAROV, a member of the Society for the Study of the History of Russian Special Services

Recently, a set of postcards of senior officials of the USSR, issued at the end of 1951, came into our possession. V.M. Molotov Goznak. On the postcards we see the order number: 1474, as well as other details of the publication: A 10357. Ed. No. 15163, 19/XII 51. Circulation 500,000 copies. Price 40 kop.

Such sets were produced specifically for the design of red corners - rooms or special structures (stands), in any enterprise or institution set aside for the needs of agitation and political education. Red corners were also called the Centers of Culture, and in military units - Lenin's rooms. There were even camping Lenkomnaty in the likeness of the Camping Church. Most likely, someone kept this set for the purpose of further use - it was not so easy to get it. But, after the death of I.V. Stalin in 1953, the set lost its relevance and got lost in piles of unnecessary things.

Most likely, members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, who were members of this party governing body at the end of 1951, were included in the recruitment. It is known that the last composition of the Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU life of I.V. Stalin approved and elected at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU on October 16, 1952, consisting of: L.P. Beria, N.A. Bulganin, K.E. Voroshilov, L.M. Kaganovich, G.M. Malenkov, M.G. Pervukhin, M.3. Saburov, I.V. Stalin, N.S. Khrushchev.

On the postcards we see the previous composition of the leadership of the party and government (the positions occupied by the temporary period, exciting 1951, are indicated):

Stalin Joseph Vissarionovich- Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (March 25, 1919 - March 5, 1953), Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (1934-1952), Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR (March 19, 1946 - March 5, 1953).

Molotov Vyacheslav Mikhailovich- Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (January 1, 1926 - June 29, 1957), First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR (March 19, 1946 - June 29, 1957).

Shvernik Nikolai Mikhailovich- Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (October 16, 1952 - March 5, 1953), Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR (March 19, 1946 - March 15, 1953). Probably included in the set of postcards as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR - ex officio.

Andreev Andrey Andreevich- Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (February 4, 1932 - October 16, 1952), Chairman of the Party Control Commission under the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR (March 19, 1946 - March 15, 1953)

Beria Lavrenty Pavlovich- Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (March 18, 1946 - July 7, 1953), Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR - supervised the work of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of State Security and the Ministry of State Control (March 19, 1946 - March 5, 1953).

Bulganin Nikolai Alexandrovich- Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (February 18, 1948 - September 5, 1958), Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR (March 5, 1947 - April 7, 1950).

Voroshilov Kliment Efremovich- Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (January 1, 1926 - July 16, 1960), Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR (March 19, 1946 - March 15, 1953).

Kaganovich Lazar Moiseevich- Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (July 13, 1930 - June 29, 1957), Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Chairman of the State Committee of the Council of Ministers of the USSR for the material and technical supply of the national economy (December 18, 1947 - March 5, 1953).

Kosygin Alexey Nikolaevich- Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (September 4, 1948 - October 16, 1952 - the first time), Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Minister of Light Industry of the USSR (March 19, 1946 - March 15, 1953).

Malenkov Georgy Maximilianovich- Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (March 18, 1946 - June 29, 1957), Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR (August 2, 1946 - March 5, 1953).

Mikoyan Anastas Ivanovich- Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (February 1, 1935 - April 8, 1966), Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR (March 19, 1946 - March 15, 1953).

Khrushchev Nikita Sergeevich- Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (March 22, 1939 - October 14, 1964), First Secretary of the Moscow Regional (MK) and City (MGK) Committees and Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU (December 16, 1949 - March 10, 1953).

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“We conferred here in the Politburo” ... Brezhnev often repeated this phrase not only in jokes, but also in real life. Its Politburo was the body of the country's collective leadership, and many of its members were simply untouchables.
1. Mikhail Suslov. 1902-1982. Member of the Politburo from 1955 until his death.
Mikhail Suslov first got into the Politburo under Stalin, but not for long. But his second visit was much longer.
Suslov often appears in jokes about Brezhnev
Since 1955, he registered in the Politburo, as they say, forever and ever. And since then, he has gradually increased his influence, the peak of which fell just at the time of Brezhnev. Suslov was considered the mastermind behind the conspiracy against Khrushchev. Already during the period of stagnation, he had a reputation as a gray cardinal. Suslov was responsible for ideology, censorship and culture. Even Brezhnev was afraid to argue with him. We will probably never know the true scale of his activities on the ideological front. But it is believed that it was he who was behind the deportations of Solzhenitsyn and Bukovsky, that it was he who organized the persecution of Sakharov, that it was he who insisted on the introduction of troops into Afghanistan. Suslov, apparently, was supposed to replace Brezhnev in power after the death of the Secretary General, but did not live up to this moment. And Suslov appears in most of the jokes of that era. Moreover, in them he appears even as a less adequate character than Brezhnev himself.
2. Alexey Kosygin. 1904−1980. Member of the Politburo from 1960 until almost his death.
Kosygin also often appears in jokes about Brezhnev, but, unlike Suslov, he, as a rule, appeared there as a cheerful and cheerful person.


The country learned about Kosygin's death only a week later.
This party leader constantly changed various minor positions in the Politburo, which he combined with the post of chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. In fact, he was a prime minister, but a technical prime minister. Although 16 years at the head of the government is a record in Russian history. And Kosygin's element was the economy. He constantly planned and carried out various kinds of financial reforms. The reforms did not change the way of life in the country in any way, but were reduced to improving planning systems. There is an opinion that Kosygin and Brezhnev hated each other and in last years didn't even talk to each other. In recent years, it was generally difficult for Kosygin to talk, because he suffered two severe heart attacks. He was removed from the Politburo a couple of months before his death. And the day of death coincided with Brezhenev's birthday, so the country learned about Kosygin's death with a week's delay. By the way, Mikhail Gorbachev took Kosygin's place in the Politburo.
3. Arvid Pelshe. 1899−1983. Member of the Politburo from 1966 until his death.
Another eternal and untouchable member of the Brezhnev Politburo. He was also regularly, like the Secretary General, awarded the Order of Lenin.

Pelshe often ransacked editors-in-chief of newspapers
True, Pelshe could not have had more such orders than Brezhnev, so for him the number of awards stopped at seven. In the Politburo, he headed the party control committee, explain what he did modern man quite difficult. In general, this is also an ideology, but on a smaller scale than that of Suslov. But Pelshe reveled in plenty of petty power. He liked to hawk the editors-in-chief of Soviet newspapers. From his submission, indescribable instructions were sent to various universities in the country. In addition, Pelshe wrote the most boring books on the history of the CPSU, which in those years were required reading for hundreds of thousands of Soviet students.
4. Nikolai Podgorny. 1903-1983. Member of the Politburo 1960-1977.
An inconspicuous Podgorny member of the Politburo, who did not have much authority among his "colleagues" and any great power.

Podgorny liked to be called the President of the USSR
He would not deserve to be mentioned here at all, if not for one interesting detail. The fact is that Podgorny held the post of Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. And since the Council was the highest authority in the Union, Podgorny, in fact, became the head of state. That is why he often demanded from journalists that they call him the president of the USSR. Everything would be fine if Brezhnev also did not want to feel like the head of state. In 1977, it was decided that the post of Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Council would be combined with the post of General Secretary. So Brezhnev swallowed Podgorny. There was no new job in the Politburo for the "President of the USSR". In the last years of his life, Podgorny became a personal pensioner of federal significance. Roughly speaking, the state took on huge expenses for its maintenance.
5. Dmitry Ustinov. 1908−1984. Member of the Politburo from 1976 until his death.
Dmitry Ustinov is one of the few people who received the rank of marshal without being in the military.


Ustinov had every chance of becoming Secretary General
During the Great Patriotic War, he was the people's commissar of armaments. Then they forgot about him for a long time, and remembered only in 1976. In this year, Ustinov became Minister of Defense and a member of the Politburo. He experienced a painful passion for various kinds of awards. Orders of Lenin he had accumulated as many as 11 pieces. It would not be superfluous to say that it was Ustinov who insisted that it was necessary to overtake the United States in the arms race and that it was he who was responsible for the introduction of Soviet troops into Afghanistan. Ustinov did not live to see their withdrawal from this country. However, the conclusion could not have taken place with Ustinov alive. It is believed that the Minister of Defense after the death of Brezhnev could become the new Secretary General. But the Politburo, in the end, supported Andropov's candidacy.

THE USSR. Composition of the supreme governing bodies of the CPSU and the USSR (June 1977)

Politburo and Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPSU

Members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU: L. I. Brezhnev, Yu. V. Andropov, V. V. Grishin, A. A. Gromyko, A. P. Kirilenko, A. N. Kosygin, F. D. Kulakov, D. A Kunaev, K. T. Mazurov, A. Ya. Pelshe, G. V. Romanov, M. A. Suslov, D. F. Ustinov, V. V. Shcherbitsky.

Candidate members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU: G. A. Aliev, P. N. Demichev, P. M. Masherov, B. N. Ponomarev, Sh. R. Rashidov, M. S. Solomentsev.

General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU - L. I. Brezhnev. Secretaries of the Central Committee of the CPSU: M. A. Suslov, A. P. Kirilenko, F. D. Kulakov, B. N. Ponomarev, I. V. Kapitonov, V. I. Dolgikh, M. V. Zimyanin, K. U. Chernenko, Ya. P. Ryabov, K. V. Rusakov.

Chairman of the Party Control Committee under the Central Committee of the CPSU - A. Ya. Pelshe.

Chairman of the Central Audit Commission of the CPSU - G. F. Sizov.

Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR

Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR - L. I. Brezhnev; Deputy Chairmen of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR: M. A. Yasnov (from the RSFSR), A. F. Vatchenko (from the Ukrainian SSR), I. E. Polyakov (from the BSSR), N. M. Matchanov (from the Uzbek SSR), S. B. Niyazbekov (from the Kazakh SSR), P. G. Gilashvili (from the Georgian SSR), K. A. Khalilov (from the Azerbaijan SSR), A. S. Barkauskas (from the Lithuanian SSR), K. F. Ilyashenko (from the Moldavian SSR), P. Ya. Strautmanis (from the Latvian SSR), T. Kulatov (from the Kirghiz SSR), M. Kholov (from the Tajik SSR), A.-M. Klychev (from the Turkmen SSR), A. P. Vader (from the Estonian SSR); secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR - MP Georgadze; members of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR - I. I. Artobolevsky, R. G. Gamzatov, A. V. Gitalov, V. V. Grishin, N. A. Zlobin, V. I. Konotop, D. A. Kunaev, P. M. Masherov, V. V. Nikolaeva-Tereshkova, N. A. Novoselova, Z. P. Pukhova, Sh. R. Rashidov, G. V. Romanov, G. N. Smirnov, F. A. Tabeev, L. G. Tynel, S. S. Tsetsegov, M. Z. Shakirov, V. V. Shcherbitsky.

Chairman of the Council of the Union - A.P. Shitikov. Chairman of the Council of Nationalities - V.P. Ruben.

Council of Ministers of the USSR

Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR - A. N. Kosygin. The first deputies of the chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR - K. T. Mazurov, N. A. Tikhonov. Deputy Chairmen of the Council of Ministers of the USSR - I. V. Arkhipov, N. K. Baibakov, V. E. Dymshits, K. F. Katushev, V. L. Kirillin, M. A. Lesechko, N. V. Martynov, V. N. Novikov, I. T. Novikov, Z. N. Nuriev, L. V. Smirnov.

Ministers of the USSR (all-Union ministries): aviation industry - V. A. Kazakov, automotive industry - V. N. Polyakov, foreign trade - N. S. Patolichev, gas industry - S. A. Orudzhev, civil aviation - B. P. Bugaev, mechanical engineering - V. V. Bakhirev, mechanical engineering for animal husbandry and fodder production - K. N. Belyak, mechanical engineering for light and food industries and household appliances - I. I. Pudkov, medical industry - A. K. Melnichenko, marine fleet - T. B. Guzhenko, oil industry - N. A. Maltsev, defense industry - S. A. Zverev, general engineering - S. A. Afanasyev, instrumentation, automation and control systems - K. N. Rudnev, communications industry - E. K. Pervyshin, communications - I. G. Pavlovsky, radio industry - P. S. Pleshakov, medium mechanical engineering - E. P. Slavsky, machine-tool and tool industry - A. I. Kostousov, construction, road and municipal engineering - E. S. Novoselov, construction of enterprises in the oil and gas industry - B. E. Shcherbina, shipbuilding industry - M. V. Egorov, tractor and agricultural engineering - I. F. Sinitsyn, transport construction - I. D. Sosnov, heavy and transport engineering - V. F. Zhigalin, chemical and oil engineering - K. I. Brekhov, chemical industry - L. A. Kostandov, pulp and paper industry - K. I. Galanshin, electronic industry - A. I. Shokin, electrical industry - A. K. Antonov, power engineering - V. V. Krotov.

Ministers of the USSR (Union-Republican ministries): internal affairs - N. A. Shchelokov, higher and secondary specialized education - V. P. Elyutin, geology - E. A. Kozlovsky, procurement - G. S. Zolotukhin, health - B. V. Petrovsky, foreign affairs - A. A. Gromyko, culture - P. N. Demichev, light industry - N. N. Tarasov, timber and woodworking industry - N. V. Timofeev, land reclamation and water management - E. E. Alekseevsky, installation and special construction works - B. V. Bakin, meat and dairy industry - S. F. Antonov, oil refining and petrochemical industry - V. S. Fedorov, defense - D. F. Ustinov, food industry - V. P. Lein, industrial construction - A. M. Tokarev, industry building materials- I. A. Grishmanov, education - M. A. Prokofiev, fisheries - A. A. Ishkov, communications - N. V. Talyzin, rural construction - S. D. Khitrov, agriculture - V. K. Month, construction - G. A. Karavaev, construction of heavy industry enterprises - N. V. Goldin, trade - A. I. Struev, coal industry - B. F. Bratchenko, finance - V. F. Garbuzov, non-ferrous metallurgy - P. F Lomako, ferrous metallurgy - I.P. Kazanets, energy and electrification - P.S. Neporozhny, justice - V.I. Terebilov.

The chairmen of the state committees of the Council of Ministers of the USSR: planning - N. K. Baibakov, for construction - I. T. Novikov, for logistics - N. V. Martynov, people's control - A. M. Shkolnikov, for labor and social issues - V. G. Lomonosov, for science and technology - V. A. Kirillin, for inventions and discoveries - Yu. E. Maksarev, prices - N. T. Glushkov, standards - V. V. Boitsov, for professional technical education - A. A. Bulgakov, television and radio broadcasting - S. G. Lapin, cinematography - F. T. Ermash, publishing, printing and book trade - B. I. Stukalin, forestry - G. I Vorobyov, for external economic relations - S. A. Skachkov. Chairman of the State Security Committee under the Council of Ministers of the USSR - Yu. V. Andropov. Chairman of the All-Union Association "Soyuzselkhoztekhnika" of the Council of Ministers of the USSR - A. A. Yezhevsky. Chairman of the Board of the State Bank of the USSR - V. S. Alkhimov. Head of the Central Statistical Office under the Council of Ministers of the USSR. - L. M. Volodarsky.

The Council of Ministers of the USSR includes the chairmen of the Councils of Ministers of the Union Republics ex officio: M. S. Solomentsev (RSFSR), A. P. Lyashko (Ukrainian SSR), T. Ya. Kiselev (BSSR), N. D. Khudaiberdiev (Uzbek SSR) , B. A. Ashimov (Kazakh SSR), Z. A. Pataridze (Georgian SSR), A. I. Ibragimov (Azerbaijan SSR), I. A. Manyushis (Lithuanian SSR), S. K. Grossu (Moldavian SSR) , Yu. Ya. Ruben (Latvian SSR), A. S. Suyumbaev (Kyrgyz SSR), R. Nabiev (Tajik SSR), F. T. Sarkisyan (Armenian SSR), B. Yazkuliev (Turkmen SSR), V. I Klauson (Estonian SSR).

First Secretaries of the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the Union Republics

V. V. Shcherbitsky (CP of Ukraine), P. M. Masherov (CP of Belarus), Sh. R. Rashidov (CP of Uzbekistan), D. A. Kunaev (CP of Kazakhstan), E. A. Shevardnadze (CP of Georgia), G. A. Aliev (Azerbaijani CP), P. P. Grishkevicius (Lithuanian CP), I. I. Bodyul (Moldavian CP), A. E. Voss (Latvia CP), T. Usubaliev (Kyrgyzstan CP), D. Rasulov (CP of Tajikistan), K. S. Demirchyan (CP of Armenia), M. Gapurov (CP of Turkmenistan), I. G. Kabin (CP of Estonia).

Chairmen of the Presidiums of the Supreme Soviets of the Union Republics

M. A. Yasnov (RSFSR), A. F. Vatchenko (Ukrainian SSR), I. E. Polyakov (BSSR), N. M. Matchanov (Uzbek SSR), S. B. Niyazbekov (Kazakh SSR), P. G Gilashvili (Georgian SSR), K. A. Khalilov (Azerbaijan SSR), A. S. Barkauskas (Lithuanian SSR), K. F. Ilyashenko (Moldavian SSR), P. Ya. Strautmanis (Latvian SSR), T. Kulatov (Kyrgyz SSR), M. Kholov (Tajik SSR), B. E. Sarkisov (Armenian SSR), A.-M. Klychev (Turkmen SSR), A. P. Vader (Estonian SSR).

Chairmen of the Councils of Ministers of the Union Republics

M. S. Solomentsev (RSFSR), A. P. Lyashko (Ukrainian SSR), T. Ya. Kiselev (BSSR), N. D. Khudaiberdiev (Uzbek SSR), B. A. Ashimov (Kazakh SSR), Z. A Pataridze (Georgian SSR), A. I. Ibragimov (Azerbaijan SSR), I. A. Manyushis (Lithuanian SSR), S. K. Grossu (Moldavian SSR), Yu. Ya. Ruben (Latvian SSR), A. S. Suyumbaev (Kyrgyz SSR), R. Nabiev (Tajik SSR), F. T. Sarkisyan (Armenian SSR), B. Yazkuliev (Turkmen SSR), V. I. Klauson (Estonian SSR).

Great Soviet Encyclopedia. - M.: Soviet Encyclopedia. 1969-1978 .

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Special Folder (1988)

Note of the Commission of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU on the additional study of materials related to the repressions that took place in the period of the 30-40s - early 50s

Soviet secret

Special folder

The Commission of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU for the additional study of materials related to the repressions that took place in the period of the 30s-40s-early 50s continues to work on the rehabilitation of people who were unreasonably convicted in these decades. This work contributes to the formation of a new moral atmosphere, the revival of the public need for law and order, respect for constitutional and legal norms. The honorable name and dignity of many thousands of unsullied people have been restored, and the heavy burden of unfounded accusations and suspicions has been lifted. At present, 1,002,617 criminal cases of a repressive nature have already been reviewed for 1,586,104 people. 1,354,902 people were rehabilitated in these cases, including 1,182,825 people in cases of non-judicial bodies. In addition to restoring social and legal justice, the work carried out in this direction contributes to a deeper understanding of the causes, internal mechanisms of lawlessness and arbitrariness, which had such a strong and long-term impact on the social development of the country. At the same time, the experience of the Commission's work raises questions that seem to require a fundamental political and constitutional assessment. Only now, in the context of the democratization of society, are the real scales of the repressions that took place, the degree of their lawlessness, and thus the socio-political, legal significance of the work on a comprehensive analysis and assessment of these phenomena beginning to be revealed. In this regard, four groups of issues require special consideration and evaluation.

1. On the anti-constitutionality, illegality of "triples", "twos", special meetings, lists, etc. A significant part of the sentences in repressive cases was issued by these non-judicial and non-constitutional bodies. As a result of the study of documentary materials by the state security agencies, it was established that in the period 1930-1953, 3,778,234 people were subjected to repressions, including those sentenced to capital punishment (execution ) 786,098 people. Among the persons subjected to repressions, 1,229,828 people were convicted by the judicial authorities (including 129,550 to death), by non-judicial authorities - 2,478,406 people (including to execution - 656,548 people). Currently, 1,575,975 cases for 2,192,130 people remain unreviewed. In their total number - 738,866 cases produced by non-judicial bodies, in which 1,097,293 people were convicted (including 339,125 people to execution). The leadership of the Supreme Court of the USSR, many lawyers draw attention to the fact that the appeal hearing of sentences passed in 1930-1953. non-judicial bodies, gives these latter the appearance of legality, while in reality their creation and functioning, their very existence were unconstitutional, did not rely on the legal acts of their time. But since such bodies were initially illegal, then any sentences passed by them cannot be considered legal. This position is justified by both legal and moral and political criteria. Therefore, apparently, it would be correct if the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR decided to declare all the listed non-judicial bodies unconstitutional. Thus, all victims of non-judicial decisions are automatically rehabilitated. At the same time, such a decision should not apply to a special procedure for considering criminal cases of robberies, robberies, gang attacks, and other crimes during the Great Patriotic War, when such crimes were executed on the spot without trial or investigation.

2. On the personal responsibility of Stalin and his immediate circle for the organization and implementation of mass repressions, the imposition of illegal, unconstitutional practices. Their guilt before the party and the people for mass repressions and lawlessness is enormous and unforgivable. The further, the more obvious it becomes that this guilt is not only moral and political, but also a direct legal, criminal character. The public rightfully demands an appropriate assessment. For the first time, mass repressions were carried out in the early 1930s. By the decision of the Commission of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on the eviction of kulaks, headed by A.A. Andreev, the organs of the OGPU carried out the eviction from the European part of the USSR to the northern regions and Siberia in 1930-1931 356.5 thousand peasant families with a total number of 1.680 .000 people. Some of them were sent to places of detention, others - to special settlements. In 1929-1933, the organs of the State Prosecution only arrested and prosecuted 519,000 people classified as kulaks. This does not include hundreds of thousands of dispossessed and subject to exile. It was during these years that the so-called "troikas" were created at the suggestion of L. M. Kaganovich. The strengthening of repressions was facilitated by a change in legislation towards the utmost simplification of the possibilities of arrest and investigation in cases of a political nature. Since the beginning of the 1930s, there has been a simplification of legal proceedings and, at the same time, a toughening of the penalties applied in this case by extrajudicial bodies. The scope of the arrests was so great that in a special directive letter of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR (May 1933), signed by Stalin and Molotov, there was an indication that there should not be more than 400 thousand people in places of preliminary detention. Orders were established for the number of arrests and the number of deportees. In the early 1930s, falsified political trials were carried out on representatives of various groups of the intelligentsia. Monstrous scale mass repression took in the second half of the 30s. They seized the party, Soviet, economic assets, broad sections of workers, peasants, and intelligentsia. Stalin was the initiator and organizer of mass arrests, executions without trial or investigation, and the deportation of hundreds of thousands of people. The criminal practice was widespread, consisting in the fact that the NKVD compiled lists of persons whose cases were subject to consideration in the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR or by a “special meeting” of the NKVD, moreover, “punishment” was determined in advance. These lists were sent personally to Stalin. The lists determined three categories of punishment: the first - execution,
the second - imprisonment from 8 to 25 years and
the third - imprisonment up to 8 years and expulsion.
At present, only a part of the lists that were sent by the NKVD to Stalin personally have been discovered. Thus, 383 lists were found for 1937-1938, which included 44,000 prominent party workers, military figures, and business executives. From this number
39 thousand were to be convicted under the first category,
5 thousand - on the second and
102 people - on the third.
These lists contain handwritten resolutions by Stalin and other members of the Politburo, in particular from 383 lists

Stalin signed 362,

Molotov - 373,

Voroshilov - 195,

Kaganovich - 191,

Zhdanov - 177.

There are also signatures of Mikoyan, Yezhov and S. Kosior. The members of the Politburo not only agreed with the proposed repressions, but also made notes encouraging the employees of the NKVD bodies to further repressions, and against individual names there were inscriptions: "Beat - beat." The most gross violations of socialist legality, the introduction into the daily practice of the NKVD of the use of methods of physical coercion, torture and torture of those arrested, which led to the so-called "confessions" and slander of innocent people, were openly sanctioned by Stalin on behalf of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. Judging by the documents, Stalin personally exercised control over the repressive activities. Molotov, Kaganovich, Beria, Voroshilov, Zhdanov, Malenkov, Mikoyan, Khrushchev, Bulganin, Andreev, S. Kosior, Suslov are directly responsible for the repressions and lawlessness, besides Stalin. They gave personal instructions about the arrests, convictions and executions of a large number of party, Soviet, military and economic personnel. To expand and intensify local mass repression, tension and mutual suspicion, members of the Politburo traveled to local party organizations, often accompanied by a group of NKVD workers. Such trips, as a rule, were accompanied by the removal from work and arrests of the first secretaries of the regional committees and the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the Union republics, repressions of party and Soviet activists. V.M. Molotov, being the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR (from 1930 to 1941), took an active part in organizing and carrying out mass repressions in the 30s. On his responsibility, first of all, the repression of employees of the central Soviet apparatus. Many of them were arrested and physically destroyed on his personal initiative. Of the people's commissars who were members of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR in 1935, 20 people died during the years of repression. Only Mikoyan, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Andreev, Litvinov and Molotov himself survived. Of the 28 people who made up the Council of People's Commissars at the beginning of 1938, 20 people were soon repressed. In just six months, from October 1936 to March 1937, about 2 thousand employees of the People's Commissariats of the USSR were arrested (excluding the People's Commissariat of Defense, the NKVD, the NKID). In August 1937, Yezhov prepared the so-called "operational" order of the NKVD to conduct a mass operation to repress people of Polish nationality. There are signatures on this order: "For - I.V. Stalin, V. Molotov, L. Kaganovich, S. Kosior."

In total, during the period from August to December 1937, 18,193 people were repressed during this operation. There were cases when, instead of a sanction for imprisonment, Molotov put next to some names the marks VMN (the highest penalty). In 1949, Molotov authorized the arrest of many Soviet and foreign citizens accused of espionage and anti-Soviet activities. Most of them have now been rehabilitated due to the absence of corpus delicti.

L.M. Kaganovich

The whole path of L.M. Kaganovich as a political figure is connected with treachery and repressions. The grave consequences of his activities during the years of collectivization in Ukraine, the Voronezh region, the North Caucasus, and Western Siberia are known. It was Kaganovich who, in the early 1930s, put forward a proposal to introduce emergency extrajudicial bodies - the so-called "troikas". Kaganovich played a particularly sinister role during the years of mass repressions of 1935-1939. With the sanction of Kaganovich, many responsible and ordinary workers of railway transport and heavy industry were arrested on charges of counter-revolutionary and sabotage activities, who were then sentenced to capital punishment and long prison terms based on falsified materials. The original letters and Kaganovich's sanctions for the arrest of 1,587 railway workers who were repressed in 1937-1939 comprise 5 volumes. As can be seen from Kaganovich's correspondence with the NKVD of the USSR, in some cases he authorized the arrests of persons on whom compromising materials were presented to him, and in others he himself initiated the arrests. To organize mass repressions, Kaganovich traveled to the Chelyabinsk, Yaroslavl, Ivanovo regions, Donbass. Immediately upon his arrival in Ivanovo, he sent a telegram to Stalin: "The first acquaintance with the materials shows that it is necessary to immediately arrest the secretary of the regional committee Epanechnikov, it is also necessary to arrest the head of the propaganda department of the regional committee Mikhailov." When, at the plenum of the regional committee, the secretary of the Ivanovo city committee, A.A. Vasilyev, questioned the hostile activities of the arrested workers of the regional party committee, Kaganovich demanded that he be expelled from the party and ordered his arrest. In the same way, he acted in other regional organizations, where he was sent to expand mass repressions. After his trip to Ivanovo, only with the sanction of the members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, 297 people were repressed.

A.A. Zhdanov,

for a long time actually fulfilling the duties of the second secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, he is directly responsible for organizing mass repressions. In September 1936, together with Stalin, in a telegram addressed to the Politburo, he demanded an increase in repression. At their suggestion, the NKVD was headed by Yezhov. Zhdanov is guilty of organizing reprisals against the party and Soviet activists of a number of local party organizations, and primarily the Leningrad one. In 1935-1940, 68 thousand 88 people were repressed in Leningrad. Only according to the lists personally signed by Zhdanov, 879 Leningraders were repressed. To expand mass repressions, Zhdanov traveled to the Bashkir, Tatar and Orenburg party organizations. In the Orenburg region for five months (from April to September 1937) 3,655 people were repressed, half of them were sentenced to capital punishment. Nevertheless, Zhdanov, arriving in Orenburg in early September 1937, found these repressions insufficient. According to his telegram to Stalin, the first secretary of the regional committee, Mitrofanov, was arrested, followed by numerous arrests in Orenburg and the region, and only according to the lists of the NKVD, which were considered in the Politburo after Zhdanov's trip, another 598 people were repressed.

After Zhdanov's trip to Bashkiria, the first and second secretaries of the regional committee were arrested, according to the lists of the NKVD, 342 people from among the party and Soviet activists were repressed in the Politburo. After the "purge" carried out by Zhdanov in the Tatar Party organization, 232 people were arrested and almost all of them were shot. Zhdanov played an active role in the massacre of the leadership of the Komsomol Central Committee in 1938. Speaking on behalf of the Politburo, he described the secretaries of the Central Committee of the Komsomol as "traitors, terrorists, spies, fascists, enemies of the people politically rotten through and through, who pursued an enemy line in the Komsomol, like a counter-revolutionary gang". In its wording, a resolution of the plenum was adopted, which confirmed these assessments.

Zhdanov was one of the organizers of the August (1948) session of VASKhNIL. In a memorandum addressed to Stalin dated July 10, 1948, he formulated the proposals that formed the basis for the decision of the session and marked the beginning of the persecution of a large group of biologists. Zhdanov was the initiator of the persecution and persecution of many representatives of Soviet artistic culture and science.

K. E. Voroshilov.

K. E. Voroshilov took an active part in organizing the repressions. With his sanction, the destruction of the cadres of senior military leaders and political workers of the Red Army was organized. In the 30s, 3 out of 5 marshals were destroyed, 15 out of 16 commanders of the first and second ranks, 60 out of 67 commanders, 136 out of 199 commanders, 4 out of 4 flagships of the fleet, 6 out of 6 flagships of the first ranag, out of 15 flagships of the second rank - 9. All 17 army commissars of the first and second ranks, as well as 25 out of 29 corps commissars, were killed.

Voroshilov is directly responsible for the fact that in 1937-1939, on falsified materials, many prominent figures and commanders of the Red Army were accused of participating in the so-called "military fascist conspiracy". When he was the People's Commissar of Defense in the Red Army in 1936-1940, more than 36 thousand people were repressed. More than 300 Voroshilov's sanctions for the arrest of prominent Red Army commanders were revealed in the KGB archive. Requests and certificates of the NKVD of the USSR, sent in 1937-1938 to Voroshilov on the authorization of arrests and dismissals from the army of the command staff of the Red Army in connection with the disclosure of the "military fascist conspiracy", amount to 60 volumes. In a number of cases, Voroshilov himself initiated the arrests and repressions of prominent commanders of the Red Army, including Fedko (his first deputy), Orlov (commander of the Navy), Smirnov (People's Commissar of the Navy).

N.S. Khrushchev,

working in 1936-1937 as the first secretary of the MK and MGK of the CPSU (b), and since 1938 - the first secretary of the CC CP (b) of Ukraine, he personally agreed to the arrests of a significant number of party and Soviet workers. The KGB archive contains documentary materials that testify to Khrushchev's involvement in mass repressions in Moscow, the Moscow Region and Ukraine in the prewar years. In particular, he himself sent documents with proposals for the arrest of senior officials of the Moscow City Council, the Moscow Regional Party Committee. In total, 55 thousand 741 people were repressed in 1936-1937 by the NKVD bodies of Moscow and the Moscow region.

From January 1938, Khrushchev headed the party organization of Ukraine. In 1938, 106 thousand 119 people were arrested in Ukraine. Repression did not stop in subsequent years. In 1939, about 12 thousand people were arrested, and in 1940 - about 50 thousand people. In total, in 1938-1940, 167 thousand 565 people were arrested in Ukraine. The NKVD explained the intensification of repressions in Ukraine in 1938 by the fact that in connection with the arrival of Khrushchev, the counter-revolutionary activity of the right-wing Trotskyist underground increased especially. Khrushchev personally authorized the repression of several hundred people who were suspected of organizing a terrorist act against him. In the summer of 1938, with the approval of Khrushchev, a large group of senior officials of the party, Soviet, and economic bodies were arrested, including deputy chairmen of the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR, people's commissars, deputy people's commissars, and secretaries of regional party committees. All of them were sentenced to capital punishment and long terms of imprisonment. According to the lists sent by the NKVD of the USSR to the Politburo for 1938 alone, consent was given to the repression of 2,140 people from among the republican party and Soviet activists.

A.I. Mikoyan

AI Mikoyan bears direct responsibility for participating in mass repressions. With his sanction, hundreds of employees of the system of the People's Commissariat of Food Industry, the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade of the USSR were arrested. Mikoyan not only issued warrants for the arrest, but he himself initiated the arrests. So, in a letter addressed to Yezhov dated July 15, 1937, he proposed to carry out repressions against a number of employees of the All-Union Research Institute of Fisheries and Oceanography of the USSR People's Commissariat of Food Industry. Similar representations were made by Mikoyan in relation to employees of a number of organizations of the USSR Foreign Trade.

In the autumn of 1937, Mikoyan traveled to Armenia to carry out a purge of the party and state bodies of this republic from "enemies of the people." As a result of this campaign, hundreds and thousands of cadres of party and Soviet workers perished. Mikoyan was accompanied on this trip by Malenkov and a group of NKVD workers. The result of the direct activities of Mikoyan and Malenkov was the arrest of 1,365 communists.

Mikoyan headed a commission charged with counter-revolutionary activities of prominent members of the party. He, in particular, together with Yezhov was a speaker at the February-March Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on the Bukharin case (1937). It was Mikoyan who spoke on behalf of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks at the solemn asset of the NKVD dedicated to the 20th anniversary of the organs of the Cheka-GPU-NKVD. After praising the activities of Yezhov, justifying the massive lawless repressions, Mikoyan ended his report with the words: “The NKVD did a good job during this time!”, referring to 1937.

G.M. Malenkov,

holding the post of head of the department of leading personnel of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, he was directly related to most of the actions that were taken by the NKVD in relation to leading party workers both in the center and in the field. He repeatedly, together with representatives of the NKVD, traveled to local party organizations to carry out mass repressions. So, Malenkov, together with Yezhov, traveled to Belarus in 1937, where a real defeat was committed for the party organization of the republic. There were many cases when Malenkov was personally present at the interrogations and torture of arrested party leaders. It was in this way that Malenkov, together with Beria, fabricated the case of a counter-revolutionary organization in Armenia. Together with the workers of the NKVD, Malenkov traveled to organize repressions against party activists in Saratov, Tambov and a number of other regions. The inspection carried out established the criminal role of Malenkov in the fabrication of the "Leningrad case".

A.A. Andreev,

as a member of the Politburo and secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, he personally participated in organizing repressions in many republican party organizations in Central Asia, and in particular in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, in a number of regional and regional organizations of the Volga region and the North Caucasus. Only after his trip to the Saratov party organization, according to the lists of the NKVD, Stalin, Molotov and others authorized the application of capital punishment to 430 workers in the region, 440 party and Soviet workers in Uzbekistan, 344 in Tajikistan.

M.I. Kalinin,

Separately, it should be said about M.I. Kalinin, who, being the chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, signed the decree prepared by Stalin and Yenukidze of December 1, 1934 "On Amending the Current Criminal Procedure Codes of the Union Republics." This illegal decree freed the hands of repressive measures, making it possible to consider cases without the participation of the parties, without the right to apply for pardon, and also providing for the immediate execution of the sentence to capital punishment. Heading from 1931 to 1946 the Commission for the Investigation and Resolution of Court Cases under the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, Kalinin essentially condoned the practice of lawlessness and mass terror, leaving applications for pardon of repressed persons without consideration.

The arbitrariness of Stalin and his entourage contributed to the arbitrariness of others, including local leaders, turned lawlessness and crimes into political means, anti-constitutionality and illegality into the norm, the destructive consequences of which are almost impossible to completely overcome. The bodies of the OGPU - the NKVD, prosecutor's offices, and courts were turned into an instrument of mass repression. The leaders of party organs in the localities were drawn into the repressions. Mass repressions did not stop at the end of the 1930s. Already after the end of the Great Patriotic War, one after another, cases were fabricated against large groups of party, Soviet workers, and representatives of the intelligentsia. Only in the so-called "Leningrad case" thousands of people were illegally repressed, including prominent figures of the party, members of the Politburo, the Secretariat and the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of the party. A significant group of the Soviet intelligentsia was repressed in connection with the activities of the "Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee".

M.A. Suslov.

In fact, M.A. Suslov was the initiator of this massacre. On November 26, 1946, he sent a note to Stalin containing slanderous accusations against the committee. This note served as the basis for the investigation by the MGB authorities. In the case of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee, 140 people were convicted, 23 of them to capital punishment, 20 people to 25 years in prison.

Suslov is a participant in mass repressions when he was the secretary of the Rostov Regional Committee. Having become the first secretary of the Ordzhonikidzevsky regional party committee, he not only sharply objected to the release of a number of innocently convicted persons, but also insisted on new arrests. The commission of the NKVD of the USSR in July 1939 reported to Beria that Suslov was dissatisfied with the work of the regional department of the NKVD, as it showed complacency and carelessness. Suslov directly named the persons whose arrest was necessary. As a result, in 1939 and 1940. repression intensified in the region. As chairman of the Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks for Lithuania, he is directly responsible for the repressions, illegal evictions of a large group of people from the Baltic states. Suslov was the initiator and organizer of the persecution and persecution of many prominent representatives of the Soviet artistic and scientific intelligentsia.

3. On the places of burial of the victims of mass repressions and the perpetuation of their memory. Recently, in the media, appeals of public organizations and statements of citizens, questions about the search for places of burial of repressed persons and the perpetuation of their memory are increasingly and more persistently raised. In the archives of the KGB of the USSR there are no documentary materials containing information about all the specific places of burial, the names of the buried and their number. As a result of a survey of former NKVD officers and information received from the local population, it was possible to identify part of the burial sites. According to rough estimates, about 200,000 people are buried in them. The time of burial is also set approximately. Questions of restoring justice have now acquired exceptional political significance. The public, their relatives and friends are waiting for the complete rehabilitation of the innocent victims, the perpetuation of their memory. Such measures would contribute to the practical approval in Everyday life humanistic norms and ideals, would strengthen the authority and prestige of the USSR in the world.

4. On the restoration of historical justice in relation to the innocent deported citizens. In the letters of the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, the question is raised of the abolition of the decisions of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, on the basis of which administrative evictions were carried out in the 40s and early 50s of certain categories of citizens from the territory of these republics. In the 1940s and 1950s, administrative evictions were carried out for certain categories of citizens of the Baltic States, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Tajikistan and entire peoples of a number of regions and autonomous republics of the RSFSR. A total of 2,300,000 people of various nationalities were deported to the eastern regions of the country. Deportation decisions concerned those citizens who, according to the conclusion of the NKVD-NKGB and local authorities, represented a social danger in the region or could potentially represent it in the event of a complication of the situation in the region. They were not charged with criminal offenses, there were no statutory or other special investigations involving law enforcement officials to justify the eviction, and there were no necessary legal proceedings. In view of the foregoing, we would consider it appropriate:

Recommend to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR by a legislative act that the actions and decisions of “troikas”, “twos”, “special meetings”, lists and other forms of mass repressions are contrary to the Constitution of the USSR, socialist principles and norms of morality. To declare all such acts illegal, and the legal, political and civil consequences arising from them, infringing on the rights of citizens and destroying their dignity, without legal force. Thus, all the victims will be fully rehabilitated, including those who have lost relatives and friends. To continue, in accordance with the procedure established by law, the consideration of criminal cases against convicted persons by the judicial authorities. The Prosecutor's Office of the USSR, the Supreme Court of the USSR, the KGB of the USSR, the Ministry of Justice of the USSR and the Ministry of Finance of the USSR shall ensure work on compensation of material damage to the rehabilitated in accordance with the established procedure. All of the above cannot apply to traitors to the Motherland and punishers of the Great Patriotic War, Nazi criminals, members of nationalist gangs and their accomplices, employees involved in the falsification of criminal cases, as well as persons who committed premeditated murders and other ordinary crimes. In relation to the listed categories, the procedure established by law for appealing and reviewing their sentences applies; - recommend to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Council of Ministers of the USSR, the Presidiums of the Supreme Soviets and the Councils of Ministers of the Union and Autonomous Republics, other local authorities == cancel the adopted decrees and resolutions related to the assignment of the names of Voroshilov, Zhdanov, Kalinin, Mikoyan and Suslov to cities, districts , settlements, streets, enterprises, collective farms and state farms, military units, ships and vessels, educational institutions and other institutions and organizations located on the territory of the respective republics, territories and regions. Recommend also to cancel all other acts related to the perpetuation of the memory of these persons; - to recommend to the USSR State Committee for Public Education to submit proposals to the USSR Council of Ministers on the renaming and reorganization of scholarships named after these persons, paid to students and graduate students of various educational institutions; - to instruct the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the Union Republics, regional committees and regional party committees to create commissions from representatives of the party, Soviet bodies, prosecutor's offices, the KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, public organizations to perpetuate the memory of victims of repression. Commissions to carry out work on identifying burial sites, bringing them into proper order, erecting monuments and memorials. All expenses related to the perpetuation of the memory of the victims of repression should be covered by the state, in connection with which the Council of Ministers of the USSR should be instructed to find the necessary funds to carry out these works. The willingness of the state to bear such expenses should not be seen as opposition to amateur initiatives of the public to perpetuate the memory of the victims of repression. It would be expedient to strive to combine here the means and efforts of the state and the public; - to recommend to the Councils of People's Deputies, bodies of internal affairs and prosecution, state security to develop and implement measures to protect the burial sites of victims of repression, eliminating cases of unauthorized excavations and exhumations. At the same time, provide for the obligation of the listed bodies to conduct a thorough investigation of each statement about the alleged existence of such burials, involving members of the public and highlighting the results of the investigation in the local media.

Work on the implementation of these measures must be carried out publicly, on a broad democratic basis and with the strictest observance of the provisions of the Constitution of the USSR, procedural and other norms and requirements of the current legislation. It is called upon to become a school for educating the legal consciousness of the masses, their civil and political maturity, and is aimed at building a legal socialist state and society. It is advisable to publish the resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU on this issue in the press in the presentation and in full the resolution and a note with some extracts - in the Izvestia of the Central Committee of the CPSU. To impose control over the implementation of the resolution on the State-Legal and Ideological Departments of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Draft resolutions of the Central Committee of the CPSU and press releases are attached. A. Yakovlev
V.Medvedev
V. Chebrikov
A. Lukyanov
G. Razumovsky
B. Pugo
V. Kryuchkov
V. Boldin
G. Smirnov

Bulletin of the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation. 1995. No. 1. P. 123 -130.